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ABSTRACT TheNationalScienceAdvisoryBoardforBiosecurity(NSABB)hasrecommendedthattwoscientiﬁcpapersconcern-
ingthelaboratoryadaptationofavianH5N1inﬂuenzavirustomammal-to-mammalrespiratorytransmissionrestricttheircon-
tenttopreventothersfromreplicatingtheirwork.Afterhearingfromexpertsintheﬁeldofinﬂuenzaresearchandpublichealth,
thebeneﬁtsoftheresearchweredeemedlessimportantthanthepotentialnegativeconsequences.Theevaluationfollowedestab-
lishedNSABBproceduresandpriorpolicyrecommendationsforidentifyingdualuseresearchofconcern(DURC).Thisrecom-
mendationwasreceivedbytheUnitedStatesGovernment,endorsedandforwardedtotheresearchteamsandscientiﬁcjournals
involvedwiththepublications.
I
n October 2011, the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity (NSABB) was asked to review two papers for their
potential as dual-use research of concern (DURC). These papers
containedresultsontheadaptationofthehighlypathogenicavian
inﬂuenzaA/H5N1virustomammalianhostssuchthatitcouldbe
transmitted via respiratory droplets from animal to animal. We
found that this work had great potential for harm or misuse and
“recommended that the general conclusions highlighting the
noveloutcomebepublished,butthatthemanuscriptsnotinclude
themethodologicalandotherdetailsthatcouldenablereplication
of the experiments by those who would seek to do harm” (NIH
Press Release, http://www.nih.gov/news/health/dec2011/od-20
.htm).Therecommendation“nottopublishscientiﬁcresults”was
highly unusual and the ﬁrst such recommendation by the NSABB
membership.Weareprimarilyagroupofactivelypracticingbasic
research scientists, and we have consistently advocated for open
publication practices. As per our advisory nature to the U.S. Gov-
ernment, these recommendations were not binding and could
have been ignored. However, after careful consideration, the U.S.
Government accepted the recommendations and relayed them to
researchers and the scientiﬁc journals.
TherewasagreementbyNSABBvotingmembersfortheserec-
ommendations, though the rationale of individual members as
they arrived at the same conclusions varied. We had to judge the
beneﬁcial attributes of these research results against their poten-
tial to cause harm. Over the last 7 years, NSABB has studied the
issuesassociatedwithdual-useresearch,includingrisk/beneﬁtas-
sessments, and developed principles and tools to guide the delib-
erative process. Much of this has been formalized in a series of
reports and recommendations that are available at a public web-
site(http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/biosecurity.html).Despite
this experience and carefully crafted guidance, there are points in
the deliberations where uncertainties and even contradictory in-
formation necessitate subjective decisions. When do the negative
consequences of research results outweigh the beneﬁcial ones? Is
thereaclearandbrightlinetobecrossedoristhisamorenebulous
and fuzzy region of “yes” or “no” for this research? I will present
only my personal rationale and how I came to the strong conclu-
sionthatthisworkhadthepotentialtobeverydangerousandthat
its communication should be restricted at this time.
I heard from members of the inﬂuenza research community
and reviewed the World Health Organization (WHO) data indi-
cating that this avian virus had a very high mortality rate in hu-
mans. While the inﬂuenza A/H5N1 virus rarely infects humans,
whenitdoesitcausescatastrophicdisease.Weareallawareofthe
rapid global spread of human-adapted inﬂuenza both on a yearly
basis and during less common pandemics. The documented dev-
astationofthe1918inﬂuenzapandemic,evenwithitslowermor-
tality rate, was a testament to the powerful potential of inﬂuenza.
Thethoughtofcombiningthehighhumanmortalityofinﬂuenza
A/H5N1 with a highly transmissible human-adapted phenotype
wassobering.Apandemicbysuchapathogencouldreasonablybe
concludedtocausesuchdevastationthatitshouldbepreventedat
all costs.
I carefully considered how restricting the information would
compromise scientiﬁc research progress and even how it would
hinderpublichealtheffortstopreventsuchahorriﬁcpandemic.I
know from ﬁrsthand experience that the free ﬂow of information
is part of the best and most productive research endeavors and
thatanyrestrictionsburdentheprogress.Theconclusionthatthis
viruscouldbeadaptedtomammal-to-mammalrespiratorytrans-
mission was, in my mind, the foremost beneﬁcial part of the re-
search.Withthisﬁrmconclusioninhand,policymakers,granting
agencies, public health ofﬁcials, and vaccine and drug developers
should have both the motivation and a compelling argument to
move forward to improve our inﬂuenza-ﬁghting infrastructure.
The details of the research, on the other hand, would add little to
this short-term effort and could enable someone to replicate the
work in a short period of time. The short-term negative conse-
quences of restricting experimental details seemed small in con-
trast to the large consequences of facilitating the replication of
these experiments by someone with nefarious intent. Current
public health surveillance and public health responses would
be enhanced little by these details. This comes not only from
myownprofessionalexperienceingloballytrackingdangerous
pathogens but also from personally watching the 2009 H1N1
inﬂuenza pandemic spread globally. It was impossible to con-
tain, and I believe that the same would be true for an H5N1
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low virulence, but the best current data suggest that this would
notbethecasefortheH5N1virus.Publishingadetailedexper-
imental protocol on how to produce a highly transmissible
H5N1 virus in a highly regarded scientiﬁc journal is a very bad
idea.
Since our recommendations were announced in mid-
December, there has been considerable response from scientists,
policy makers, funding agencies, and global health organizations.
There have been criticisms that we were censoring and compro-
misingacademicfreedom.Therehavebeencriticismsthatrestric-
tionofthepublicationswasinsufﬁcientandthatevenperforming
such experiments should be restricted. The debate has touched
uponbothbiosafetyandbiosecurityaspects,withsomecallingfor
the destruction of the virus or for moving all such research to the
highest safety level, biosafety level 4 (BSL-4). The NSABB has not
yet offered speciﬁc recommendations concerning these state-
ments, and my personal opinions are relatively unimportant.
Whatisgratifyingandessentialisthatthedebateisoccurring;itis
occurring on an international stage, and it is occurring rapidly.
In the midst of NSABB deliberations and formulation of our
recommendations, the need for a global debate to develop policy
has always been in our discussions. Why should the NSABB be
telling the world what to do? Why has not the world already had
these discussions and debates? How could the NSABB stimulate
the process such that global leaders in science, policy, and public
health engage in a broad-based conversation on these issues? The
speciﬁc NSABB recommendations seem to have been accepted
and are being implemented by two research groups and two sci-
entiﬁc journals; more importantly, the research issue of adapting
an avian virus to mammals, potentially humans, is a topic that is
being widely discussed. The inﬂuenza research community is vol-
untarily suggesting a moratorium on this type of research. The
WHO has agreed to participate and facilitate in policy develop-
ment. And the U.S. Government is working on guidelines for the
distribution of restricted information.
Research and public policy will be developed from this global
engagement process, a process that should increase the public’s
conﬁdence in the scientiﬁc endeavor, in scientists’ ethical behav-
ior, and in the transparency that a free research environment em-
braces.TheNSABBrecommendationshavebeeneffectiveinboth
their primary and secondary goals. They are the right recommen-
dations for this time and this problem.
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